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We develop an open economy model of a currency union with frictional goods markets and costly
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spillovers from migration. While monetary policy alone cannot correct this distortion, fiscal policy
can help by taxing or subsidizing at the regional level. When households of only one region can
migrate, optimal policy entails a deviation from the Friedman rule and a production subsidy (tax)
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both region can migrate is the Friedman rule and zero taxes in both regions.
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1 Introduction
An old idea dating back to Mundell (1961) emphasizes labor mobility as a precondition for an optimal
currency area. Within a common currency area, mobility is still widely regarded as a key adjustment
mechanism for absorbing asymmetric shocks (e.g., Bayoumi and Prasad 1997, Silva and Tenreyro
2010, DeGrauwe et al. 2014).1 However, once a country joins a currency union, migration may
be inefficiently high or low if there are regional spillovers or congestion associated with individual
migration decisions. As suggested by Lavenex and Ucarer (2002), market inefficiencies may arise from
migration patterns if there are spatial differences in income, labor productivity, or migration costs.2
Given heterogeneity across regions, spatial spillovers may also make a common monetary policy less
effective. Indeed by relinquishing monetary autonomy, monetary policy alone may not be sufficient to
correct regional distortions arising from individual migration decisions. Regional policy interventions,
such as distortionary fiscal policy, may therefore help by taxing or subsidizing at the regional level,
thereby correcting regional spillovers associated with migration.
In this paper, we develop an open economy model of a currency union with costly mobility between
regions that formalizes the interaction between migration and monetary and fiscal policy. We study
three related questions using this framework. First, under what conditions is migration across regions
socially optimal? Second, what are the effects of monetary and fiscal policy interventions on migration,
trade, and welfare? And finally, what is the optimal mix of monetary and fiscal policy that maximizes
social welfare for the union?
The model is based on an open economy version of Rocheteau and Wright (2005) where two
regions have a single monetary authority that chooses the money growth rate of a common currency.
Each region produces a tradable consumption good that can be financed with the common currency.
Regional trade occurs in decentralized goods markets where households and producers meet bilaterally
and negotiate the terms of trade. While producers have immobile factors of production, households
can invest to temporarily relocate to the other region. However due to search frictions, migration
by an individual household creates spillovers for other households in the union. Terms of trade are
negotiated through bilateral bargaining, where regional differences in bargaining power and matching
efficiency affect ex ante migration decisions.
A key implication of our model is that migration is an endogenous response to institutional differ-
1The original Mundellian proposition has been generalized and extended in multiple ways, e.g., to emphasize the
importance of income transfers through fiscal policy, integrated financial or capital markets, and public insurance
schemes (McKinnon 1963, Kenen 1969, Ingram 1962). For surveys, see Tavlas (1993) and DeGrauwe et al. (2014).
2These regional differences are especially prevalent across countries in Europe where annual cross border migrations
rates across countries are between 0.3% to 1% in 2010, compared with compared with interstate migrations rates in the
U.S. of around 2.4% (Eurofound 2014).
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ences among regions. In particular, migration rates decrease with market power of producers in the
destination region but increase with mark ups at home. These findings are consistent with evidence
that migration is driven by movement to regions with higher expected surpluses.3 However, whether
or not equilibrium migration is socially efficient is more subtle since an individual household also
imposes a congestion externality upon moving to other households in the destination region.
Indeed, we show that equilibrium with migration is generically inefficient along both intensive and
extensive margins of trade. First, output per trade is inefficiently low due to an asynchronicity between
production and trade. Second, the number of trades can be inefficiently high or low since agents
do not internalize the externalities created by their migration decisions. Efficiency jointly requires
the Friedman rule at the union level and the Hosios condition at the regional level.4 Intuitively,
the Friedman rule eliminates the intertemporal distortion by making the opportunity cost of holding
money as low as possible, while the Hosios condition eliminates the matching inefficiency by providing
an appropriate division of the trade surplus.
To highlight these mechanisms, we first consider equilibria where only households of one region
choose to migrate. For instance, this arises if the destination region has sufficiently lower markups and
higher matching efficiency than the home region.5 Households underinvest (overinvest) in migration
if their bargaining power at home is larger (smaller) than their contribution to the matching process.
A permanent negative shock to matching efficiency at home can generate a reallocation of migration
where households go from underinvesting to overinvesting in relocating. This arises even at the
Friedman rule, except in the knife edge case where the Hosios condition is also satisfied.
Given inefficiencies along both intensive and extensive margins of trade, we next consider the roles
of monetary and fiscal policy in alleviating these distortions. In general, achieving efficiency on both
margins requires the Friedman rule and the Hosios condition are jointly satisfied. Without migration,
monetary policy alone is sufficient to achieve the first best since the only distortion is at the intensive
margin (output per trade). With endogenous migration, an additional policy instrument is needed to
correct the extensive margin distortions arising from agents’ migration decisions (number of trades).
We therefore introduce regional fiscal policy through a tax or subsidy scheme to local producers. If
there is underinvestment (overinvestment) in migration, a production subsidy (tax) in the destination
3Kennan and Walker (2010) develop a dynamic migration model where location decisions are driven by expected
incomes. See Greenwood (1997) and Molloy et al. (2011) for a summary of U.S. migration patterns. Bonin et al. (2008)
show migration patterns in the European Union are mostly driven by income differences, while the effects on labor
market outcomes like unemployment are more mixed.
4Similar inefficiencies arise in search models of money with both intensive and extensive margins of trade. See Section
1.1 for a discussion.
5Equilibrium with migration is not generically unique due to complementarities between migration decisions and
production. Intuitively, more production abroad raises the expected surplus for households to relocate which increases
migration and the hence total number of trades abroad. This raises the gain to produce abroad, thereby further raising
production.
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region increases (decreases) equilibrium migration by raising (reducing) output per trade and hence
the net gains from migration. Implicit in this analysis is our assumption that the monetary union is
also a fiscal union: the government implements regional fiscal policy financed by a common central
bank that sets a union wide money growth rate.6 The optimal policy mix is then a money growth
rate and production subsidy or tax that maximizes welfare for the union.
When household bargaining power is higher than their contribution to the matching process,
households underinvest in migration. Since a household’s incentive to move decreases with their
bargaining power at home, a sufficiently large bargaining power induces households to invest too little
in relocating. The resulting optimal policy entails a higher money growth rate than the Friedman
rule and a production subsidy in the destination region. Intuitively, a deviation from the Friedman
rule is optimal since an increase in money growth increases migration provided the destination region
has more favorable trading conditions, i.e. higher bargaining power to households or higher matching
efficiency. However, higher money growth also decreases production for both regions. To counteract
part of this distortion, the policymaker sets a production subsidy in the destination region that
increases production and migration to that region. On the other hand, when household bargaining
power is too low, households overinvest in migration. The resulting optimal policy is the Friedman
rule and a production tax in the destination region. The policymaker therefore deflates at the rate of
time preference to minimize the intensive margin distortion, which also has the additional benefit of
decreasing migration and bringing it closer to its first best level.
When households from both regions choose to migrate, the optimal policy prescription is the
Friedman rule and zero taxes. Intuitively, this arises since monetary policy is more effective at
correcting the intensive margin distortion than fiscal policy is at alleviating the extensive margin
distortion. Such a policy implies no migration by households of either region.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.1 discusses related literature. Section 2 describes the
environment. Section 3 studies the social planner problem, and Section 4 characterizes equilibrium.
We consider one sided migration in Section 5 and illustrate the optimal monetary-fiscal policy mix for
the union. We extend the analysis to include two sided migration in Section 6. Section 7 concludes.
Proofs for the paper are collected in the Appendix.
6This resonates with a classic idea from Kenen (1969) on the importance of fiscal integration for a monetary union:
“It is a chief function of fiscal policy, using both sides of the budget, to offset or compensate for regional differences,
whether in earned income or in unemployment rates. The large-scale transfer payments built into fiscal systems are
interregional, not just interpersonal...”
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1.1 Related Literature
This paper builds on the New Monetarist framework surveyed by Rocheteau and Nosal (2017) and
Lagos et al. (2017). As with many papers following this approach, we have search frictions that affect
both the frequency of trade (extensive margin) and output per trade (intensive margin). Specifically,
the way we model agents’ migration decision is similar to models with endogenous search intensity,
e.g. Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) and Berentsen et al. (2007), and models with imperfect mobility
of workers across sectors, e.g. Chang (2012) and Branch et al. (2016). Relative to these papers,
we model migration across regions in an open economy and show how this generates spillovers and
additional distortions across regions. We also analyze optimal monetary and fiscal policy whereas
these studies take these policies as given.
Our open economy model is similar to Zhang (2014) and Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2017) and relates
with recent models of currency unions in the New Monetarist tradition. In contrast to Zhang (2014)
and Gomis-Porqueras et al. (2017), our model just has one currency, endogenizes migration, and
instead of studying the conditions under which different currency regimes arise, we take the existence
of a currency union as given and focus on the positive and normative implications for migration and
trade. Bignon et al. (2015) develop a model of money and credit in a currency union and show there
are welfare gains from credit market integration but not currency market integration. Herrenbreuck
(2015) studies optimal monetary policy in an open economy model with price posting and shows
inflation can have nonmonotonic effects due consumers’ search intensity. Relative to these studies, we
study both optimal monetary and fiscal policy and explicitly model agents’ migration decisions.
More recently, Farhi and Werning (2014) also study migration in a currency union, but in a
different type of model with nominal rigidities and internal imbalances. They also show how migration
out of depressed regions may produce a positive spillover for stayers. Relative to this study, we
model a currency union without nominal rigidities and emphasize search and information frictions
that generate both a motive for migration and a role for monetary policy. In addition, we focus on
household mobility that affects the location where resources are spent, rather than labor mobility that
affects the location where income is generated. Moreover, we consider monetary policy in conjunction
with one fiscal instrument (a tax on profits in frictional markets), whereas they consider two fiscal
instruments (labor and profit taxes) but no monetary policy and design the optimal policy mix to
alleviate regional distortions from migration.
This paper is also related to the literature on optimal monetary and fiscal policy in New Mone-
tarist models where the government can commit to their future policies.7 Aruoba and Chugh (2010)
7There is also an extensive literature on monetary and fiscal policy in monetary models with nominal rigidities.
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introduce production and capital taxes in the Lagos and Wright (2005) model and study the resulting
Ramsey policy. Due to the under-accumulation of capital, optimal policy entails a subsidy on capital
income. In a similar vein, Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010) consider fiscal policy in a similar
environment but when the government does not have to finance its consumption. In that case, a
production subsidy like the one we consider in the present paper can restore efficiency.8 Relative to
these studies, we highlight how endogenous migration generates additional inefficiencies in an open
economy that monetary policy alone cannot correct. Finally, we abstract from commitment issues
by the policymaker, i.e. we restrict attention to Ramsey policies. See Martin (2011) for an analysis
of monetary and fiscal policy absent commitment in a New Monetarist model with money, nominal
bonds, and distortionary taxes.
2 Environment
Time is discrete and continues forever. There are two regions, i, j ∈ {1, 2}, each with a continuum
of infinitely lived buyers (or households), denoted by Bi and sellers (or producers), denoted by Sj .
Agents are exogenously assigned to one of the regions. Region 1 has a measure 2n of agents and
region 2 has a measure 2 of agents, where n ∈ (0, 1] is the relative size of region 1.9
Each period consists of two stages. In the first, agents meet bilaterally in decentralized markets
(DM) where buyers want to consume a regional good that only sellers from j ∈ {1, 2} can produce.
Let qj ∈ R+ denote the quantity produced in region j. Sellers have immobile factors of production and
cannot produce the other region’s good. There is lack of record keeping, no public information nor
communication of individual trading histories, and no enforcement. These frictions preclude unsecured
credit arrangements, thus generating a need for a medium of exchange. In the second stage, there is
a frictionless centralized market (CM) where all agents can produce and consume a homogenous and
perishable nume´raire good, x ∈ R, by supplying labor with a linear production technology in labor,
f(y) = y. At the end of each CM, buyers return to their region of origin. The discount factor for all
agents is β = (1 + r)−1, where r > 0 is the rate of time preference.
See e.g. Corsetti and Pesenti (2001), Beestma and Jensen (2005), Gali and Monacelli (2008), and Ferrero (2009), and
references therein. In these papers, there is a single central bank that sets a common interest rate for the union while
fiscal policy is determined at the regional level through the choice of government spending. In response to country
specific supply shocks, monetary policy is used to stabilize the union-wide economy while fiscal policy is used to stabilize
regional inflation differences and the terms of trade.
8There are also studies with policy competition between governments in open economies. See e.g. Mendoza and
Tesar (2005) for competition between welfare maximizing governments in setting an optimal tax code. Li and Matsui
(2009) and Zhang (2014) consider competition between monetary authorities in setting an optimal inflation rate.
9There are different interpretations of buyers and sellers, e.g. households purchasing consumption goods from pro-
ductive firms, or firms acquiring productive capital from suppliers. Here we take the former interpretation though our
theory would also apply to the latter.
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Migration. In the DM, buyers are mobile while sellers are immobile. For instance, buyers have
region specific skills that allow them to move across regions, while sellers have immobile factors of
production due to, e.g., regulation or prohibitively costly legal barriers that differ across regions. At
the beginning of each period, a buyer b ∈ Bi from i can invest ρbi ∈ [0, 1] units of effort to move
to region i′ ∈ {1, 2} 6= i. He moves to the other region with probability ρbi . With complementary
probability 1 − ρbi , the buyer remains in the same location. The decision ρbi represents a region i
buyer’s investment to migrate to region i′. When ρbi = 0, the buyer remains at the same location,
while ρbi = 1 means the buyer moves to the other region. When ρ
b
i ∈ (0, 1), the buyer is indifferent
between the two regions and follows a mixed strategy where they migrate with probability ρbi and
stay with probability 1 − ρbi . Relocating is costly. In particular, a buyer from i investing ρi incurs
a utility cost Φi(ρi). We assume Φ
′ > 0,Φ′′ > 0,Φ(0) = Φ′(0) = 0 and Φ′(1) = ∞. In a stationary
equilibrium, these assumptions imply that buyers are indifferent between relocating across regions.10
Let ρ̂i ≡
∫
b∈Bi ρ
b
i db denote the average migration rate for buyers in region i. In the following, we use
ρi to denote ρ
b
i when no confusion may arise.
Matching. Following migration, agents are matched pairwise in the DM by an aggregate matching
function. Since sellers are immobile, matches are formed in the seller’s location j. Given ρ̂1 and
ρ̂2, the total number of matches in region j is given by Mj(Bj ,Sj), which depends on the measures
of active buyers and sellers in region j. The matching function is constant returns to scale, twice
continuously differentiable, strictly increasing, strictly concave with respect to each argument and
satisfies Mj(0,Sj) = Mj(Bj , 0) = 0 and Mj(Bj ,Sj) ≤ min(Bj ,Sj). In region 1, the total measure
of buyers and sellers are B1 = (1 − ρ̂1)n + ρ̂2 and S1 = n, respectively. Similarly in region 2,
B2 = ρ̂1n + (1 − ρ̂2)(1 − η) and S2 = 1. The ratio of sellers to active buyers in region j, or market
tightness, is ϑj ≡ SjBj .
Conditional on migrating, an individual buyer’s meeting probability is αj (ϑj) =Mj(Bj ,Sj)/Bj =
Mj (1, ϑj). The matching probability of a seller in region j is αj(ϑj)/ϑj = Mj(Bj ,Sj)/Sj =
Mj
(
ϑ−1j , 1
)
. The dependence of the matching probabilities on market tightness reflects the usual
search and congestion externalities. We further assume αj(0) = 0, α
′
j(0) ≥ 0, αj(∞) = 1, and
α′j(∞) = 0. Table 1 summarizes buyers’ meeting probability, αj(ϑj), across meeting types. Since
matches are random, αj(ϑj)/ϑj is the matching probability of a seller in j. We denote the elasticity
10While ρi is endogenous and determined by buyers’ migration effort (the intensive margin), the measure of buyers
at the start of the DM (the extensive margin) is exogenous. In a closed economy, Lagos and Rocheteau (2005) keep the
ratio of buyers to sellers fixed and introduce endogenous search intensity. Alternatively, Rocheteau and Wright (2005)
have a fixed number of buyers and free entry by sellers while Rocheteau and Wright (2009) have a fixed total number
of agents that can choose whether to be buyers or sellers. In either case, constant returns in matching implies a focus
on market tightness rather than the overall size of the market.
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of the matching function in j as (ϑj) ≡ 1− ϑj α
′
j(ϑj)
αj(ϑj)
.
Table 1: Buyers’ Meeting Probabilities
Seller from 1 Seller from 2
Buyer from 1 (1− ρ1)α1(ϑ1) ρ1α2(ϑ2)
Buyer from 2 ρ2α1(ϑ1) (1− ρ2)α2(ϑ2)
Preferences. The period utility of an active buyer in region j originally from i is given by
U b(ρi, qj , x, y) = −Φ(ρi) + u(qj) + x− y,
where ρi is the buyer’s migration choice, qj is consumption in DM of region j, x is consumption of
nume´raire, and y is production of nume´raire. We assume u′(0) = ∞, u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0 for qj > 0.
Similarly, the period utility of a seller in region j is
U s(qj , x, y) = −c(qj) + x− y,
where c(0) = c′(0) = 0, c′ > 0, and c′′ ≥ 0. We assume c(qj) = u(qj) for some qj > 0 and let q∗ denote
the solution to c′(q∗) = u′(q∗).
Money. A single monetary authority issues a common currency for the union. The currency is
intrinsically worthless, divisible, storable and recognizable. The aggregate money supply in the CM
of period t is Mt and the relative price of money in terms of nume´raire, φt, adjusts to clear the market.
The gross growth rate of the money supply is constant over time and equal to γ ≡ Mt+1/Mt ≥ β.
New money is injected if γ > 1, or withdrawn if γ < 1, through lump sum transfers or taxes to buyers
at the beginning ofthe CM. The budget constraint for the currency union is therefore
φt(Mt+1 −Mt) = Tt, (1)
where Tt is the lump sum transfer (if γ < 1) or tax (if γ > 1) to buyers.
Timing. At the beginning of the DM, all buyers are in their exogenously assigned regions of origin.
A buyer from i chooses how much to invest to relocate to region j 6= i. Conditional on this choice,
buyers are then matched pairwise with sellers from j with probability αj . After migrating and
matching, the buyer is either in region 1 or 2, where terms of trade are determined through bilateral
bargaining. At the start of the CM, buyers receive lump sum transfers of the common currency and
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adjust their portfolios.
3 Social Optimum
As a benchmark, we first consider the social planner’s problem. The planner is constrained by the
same frictions as private agents and chooses a stationary allocation, {(ρ1, ρ2), (q1, q2)}, to maximize
total welfare for the union. Given market tightness ϑ1 =
n
(1−ρ̂1)n+ρ̂2 and ϑ2 =
1
(1−ρ̂2)+ρ̂1n , steady state
welfare is defined as the sum of agents’ utilities in the two regions:
W ≡ nα1(ϑ1)
ϑ1
[u(q1)− c(q1)] + α2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
[u(q2)− c(q2)]− nΦ1(ρ̂1)− Φ2(ρ̂2), (2)
where nα1(ϑ1)ϑ1 and
α2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
are the measure of matches in region 1 and 2, respectively. Consequently,
welfare in the union consists of the total trade surplus in DM of the two regions net of buyers’
investment in relocating. The social planner’s problem is then
(q1, q2, ρ1, ρ2) ∈ arg maxW (3)
subject to ϑ1 =
n
(1−ρ̂1)n+ρ̂2 and ϑ2 =
1
(1−ρ̂2)+ρ̂1n .
Lemma 1. The social optimum is given by q1 = q2 = q
∗, ρ1 = ρ∗1 and ρ2 = ρ∗2 that solve
u′(q∗) = c′(q∗), (4)
Φ′1(ρ
∗
1) = [α2(ϑ
∗
2)(ϑ
∗
2)− α1(ϑ∗1)(ϑ∗1)] [u(q∗)− c(q∗)], (5)
Φ′2(ρ
∗
2) = [α1(ϑ
∗
1)(ϑ
∗
1)− α2(ϑ∗2)(ϑ∗2)] [u(q∗)− c(q∗)], (6)
where ϑ∗1 ≡ n(1−ρ∗1)n+ρ∗2 and ϑ
∗
2 ≡ 1(1−ρ∗2)+ρ∗1n is market tightness at the first best and (ϑ
∗
j ) ≡ 1−
ϑ∗j α
′
j(ϑ
∗
j )
αj(ϑ∗j )
is the elasticity of the matching function at the first best.
As is standard, (4) gives the efficient quantity of production by equating the marginal gain from
consuming to the marginal cost of producing. From (5) and (6), efficient migration requires the
marginal cost of relocating, Φ′1(ρ∗1) and Φ′2(ρ∗2), equals the difference in the social marginal contribution
of relocating times the first-best surplus generated per trade.
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4 Monetary Equilibrium
We now describe agents’ decision problems in the CM and DM, respectively. We focus on stationary
equilibrium where aggregate real balances are constant over time.
At the beginning of the CM, buyers choose consumption of nume´raire, labor, and real balances to
bring forward next period. The buyer’s state is his original location, indexed by j = {1, 2}, and their
current holdings of real balances, zj ≡ φmj ∈ R+. Let W bj denote the buyer’s value function in CM
and V bj denote the buyer’s value function in the ensuing DM. In what follows, variables with a prime
denote next period’s variables. The lifetime expected utility for a buyer from j is
W bj (zj) = max
x,h,z
′
j≥0
{x− h+ β V bj (z
′
j)} (7)
s.t. x+ φm
′
j = h+ zj + T, (8)
where z
′
j is the buyer’s portfolio of real balances taken into the next DM, T ≡ T1+n is the per capita
transfer of common currency (in units of nume´raire) and V bj (z
′
j) is the buyer’s continuation value in
the next DM. Substituting m
′
j = z
′
j/φ from (8) into (7) yields
W bj (z) = zj + T + max
z
′
j≥0
{
−γz′j + β V b(z
′
j)
}
,
where γ is the gross growth rate of the money supply. Accordingly, the buyer’s lifetime utility in the
CM consists of his current period’s real balances, the lump sum transfer, and his continuation value
at the start of the next DM net of his investment in real balances. Hence, in order to hold z′j units
of real balances next period, the buyer must acquire γz′j units of real balances in the current period.
Since W bj (zj) = zj + W
b
j (0), the buyer’s CM value function is linear in his wealth, zj . In addition,
the buyer’s choice of real balances next period is independent of his current period’s real balances. So
long as γ ≥ β, sellers have no strict incentive to accumulate real balances in the DM. Consequently,
the CM value function of a seller with zj is W
s(zj) = zj + βV
s
j (0), which is also linear in zj .
Following migration, terms of trade in the DM are determined by Kalai (1977)’s proportional
bargaining solution. In region j, a buyer acquires output qj in exchange for payment dj to the seller
and receives a constant share θj of the total surplus, where θj ∈ (0, 1] is the bargaining power of a
buyer in j.11 By the linearity of W bj , the surplus of a buyer who gets qj in exchange for payment dj is
u(qj) +W
b
j (zj − dj)−W bj (zj) = u(qj)− dj , where the threat point is no trade. Similarly, the seller’s
11Differences in bargaining power across regions can reflect different laws or market structures between regions.
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surplus is dj − c(qj). The terms of trade solve the bargaining problem
max
qj ,dj
{u(qj)− dj} s.t. u(qj)− dj = θj
1− θj [dj − c(qj)] s.t. dj ≤ zj .
If zj ≥ (1 − θj)c(q∗) + θju(q∗), the buyer is unconstrained and the solution is q = q∗ and d =
(1 − θj)c(q∗) + θju(q∗). Otherwise, qj < q∗ and the buyer will just hand over all his real balances,
dj = (1− θj)u(qj) + θjc(qj). In that case, real balances are
z1 = (1− θ1)u(q1) + θ1c(q1), (9)
z2 = (1− θ2)u(q2) + θ2c(q2). (10)
Using the linearity of W bj , the lifetime value of a region 1 buyer in the DM is
V b1 (z1) = max
ρ1∈[0,1]
{−Φ1(ρ1) + (1− ρ1) α1(ϑ1) [u(q1)− d1] + ρ1 α2(ϑ2) [u(q2)− d2] + z1 +W b1 (0)}.
A buyer in region 1 incurs a investment cost Φ1(ρ1) to move to region 2. With probability (1 −
ρ1)α1(ϑ1), the buyer meets a seller from 1, in which case he gets q1 and transfers d1 in exchange to
the seller. With probability ρ1α2(ϑ2), the buyer moves to region 2 and meets a seller and receives q2
in exchange for d2. The term z1 + W
b
1 (0) results from the linearity of the CM value function and is
the value of proceeding to the next CM with one’s portfolio intact.
Given the bargaining solution, the DM value function for a region 1 buyer is
V b1 (z1) = max
ρ1∈[0,1]
{−Φ1(ρ1) + (1− ρ1) α1(ϑ1) θ1[u(q1)− c(q1)] + ρ1 α2(ϑ2) θ2[u(q2)− c(q2)] + z1 +W b1 (0)}.
Similarly, the value function for a region 2 buyer is
V b2 (z2) = max
ρ2∈[0,1]
{−Φ2(ρ2) + ρ2 α1(ϑ1) θ1[u(q1)− c(q1)] + (1− ρ2) α2(ϑ2) θ2[u(q2)− c(q2)] + z2 +W b2 (0)}.
We now turn to buyers’ mobility decisions at the beginning of the DM. When making this decision,
individuals take as given market tightness and hence aggregate migration rates. For a buyer in region
1, ρ1 ∈ [0, 1] solves
Φ′1(ρ1) = α2(ϑ2) θ2[u(q2)− c(q2)]− α1(ϑ1) θ1[u(q1)− c(q1)]. (11)
Since Φ1(·) is strictly convex, the buyer’s mobility choice is uniquely defined and is continuous by the
11
Theorem of the Maximum. The left side of (11) is the buyer’s marginal cost of moving, Φ′1(ρ1), which
must equal the marginal gain from relocating. A similar expression applies to a region 2 buyer, where
ρ2 ∈ [0, 1] solves
Φ′2(ρ2) = α1(ϑ1) θ1[u(q1)− c(q1)]− α2(ϑ2) θ2[u(q2)− c(q2)]. (12)
Conditions (11) and (12) equate the private, rather than social, cost and benefit of relocating. The
dependence of buyers’ matching probabilities on market tightness and the average relocation decisions
of other buyers generates an externality typically not internalized in equilibrium. We will revisit this
efficiency issue later in the text.
We now describe the buyer’s portfolio problem in the CM. Substituting V b1 (z1) into W
b
1 (z), and
using the linearity of W b1 , the portfolio problem for a buyer chose to move to region 1 is given by
max
z1∈R+
{−ιz1 − Φ(ρ1) + (1− ρ1) α1(ϑ1) θ1[u(q1)− c(q1)] + ρ1 α2(ϑ2) θ2[u(q2)− c(q2)]} (13)
where ι ≡ (1 + ρ)γ − 1 = γ−ββ , which can be interpreted as the nominal interest rate on an illiquid
bond denominated in the common currency. Since (13) is continuous and maximizes over a compact
set, a solution exists by the Theorem of the Maximum. The first order condition is
−ι+ (1− ρ1) α1(ϑ1) θ1 [u′(q1)− c′(q1)] ∂q1
∂z1
+ ρ1 α2(ϑ2) θ2 [u
′(q2)− c′(q2)] ∂q2
∂z1
≤ 0, (14)
where (14) holds at equality if zj > 0. Kalai bargaining implies
∂qj
∂z1
=
1
θjc′(qj) + (1− θj)u′(qj) .
As a result, z1 > 0 solves
ι = (1− ρ1) α1(ϑ1) L1(q1) + ρ1 α2(ϑ2) L2(q2), (15)
where the term Lj(·) ≡ θj [u
′(·)−c′(·)]
θjc′(·)+(1−θj)u′(·) is the marginal benefit a buyer receives from using the common
currency to trade in the DM of region j. Similarly, z2 > 0 solves
ι = ρ2 α1(ϑ1) L1(q1) + (1− ρ2) α2(ϑ2) L2(q2) (16)
Definition 1. A stationary monetary equilibrium with migration is a list {(z1, z2), (ρ1, ρ2), (q1, q2)}
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that solves (9), (10), (11), (12), (15), (16), and market clearing in the money market, z1 +nz2 = φM .
Equilibrium has a recursive structure. Once ρ1 and ρ2 are determined by (11) and (12), q1 and
q2 are obtained from (15) and (16). Real balances are then pinned down by (9) and (10). We next
compare the constrained efficient allocation given by (4), (5) and (6), with the equilibrium outcome.
The following proposition describes the conditions under which an equilibrium is constrained efficient.
Proposition 1. Equilibrium in the currency union achieves the social optimum if and only if
γ = β, (17)
θ1 = (ϑ1), (18)
θ2 = (ϑ2), (19)
where (ϑj) = 1− ϑj α
′
j(ϑj)
αj(ϑj)
is the elasticity of the matching function in region j.
According to Proposition 1, equilibrium coincides with the social optimum if and only if the Fried-
man rule holds at the union level and the Hosios condition holds at the regional level. Condition (17)
is the Friedman rule, which ensures the efficient quantity of DM output per trade by contracting the
money supply at the rate of time preference which drives the associated cost of holding real balances
to zero. While necessary, the Friedman rule is not sufficient for efficiency. Equations (18) and (19) are
the corresponding Hosios conditions for each region, which ensures individual mobility decisions are
socially optimal. Even when the Friedman rule holds, the Hosios condition is typically not satisfied,
unless in the knife edge case when buyers’ bargaining powers exactly equal to their contributions to
the matching process as implied by (18) and (19). Thus, monetary equilibrium is generically inefficient
– even at the Friedman rule – due to regional migration externalities. Before introducing additional
policy instruments, we next consider the positive implications of agents’ migration decisions.
5 One Sided Mobility
To highlight the main mechanisms of the model, we begin by studying one sided mobility where
only region 1 buyers choose to migrate while the migration rate in region 2 is fixed at ρ¯2. We
first characterize properties of equilibrium with one sided mobility and then compare with the social
optimum.
Proposition 2. Given ρ2 = ρ2, a unique steady state monetary equilibrium with one sided migration
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exists and features ρ1 > 0 if ι < ι ≡ min{ θ11−θ1 , θ21−θ2 } is small and
α2
(
1
1− ρ2
)
θ2 > α1
(
n
n+ ρ2
)
θ1. (20)
In that case, comparative statics are given by Table 2.
Table 2: Comparative Statics with One Sided Migration
ι θ1 θ2
ρ1 + − +
q1 − + +
q2 − + +
With one sided migration, there is a unique equilibrium with positive migration by region 1
households if (20) holds and inflation is not too high. A necessary condition for (20) to hold is
that trading conditions in region 2, captured by the matching probability and household bargaining
power, are sufficiently large. From Table 2, higher inflation decreases trade in both regions and
increases migration to region 2 if region 2 has more favorable terms of trade than region 1, i.e. θ2
is large relative to θ1. Intuitively, buyers choose to relocate to regions they expect to have larger
surpluses. As expected, migration to region 2 increases with θ2, while the frequency of trades in
region 2 decreases. In contrast, migration to region 2 decreases with θ1 since this makes staying in
region 1 more attractive.
In general, stationary equilibria may not be unique for all ι. Multiple steady states may arise due
to a complementarity between output produced in the destination region and households’ migration
decisions. From (15) and (16), output produced in region 1, q1, is decreasing in the migration rate, ρ1,
while output produced in region 2, q2, is increasing in ρ1. Intuitively, higher DM production in region
2 raises the expected surplus of relocating for households in region 1, which increases the migration
rate ρ1 and hence the total number of trades in region 2,B2α2(ϑ2) = [(1−ρ¯2)+ρ1n]α2(ϑ2). This makes
trade in region 2 more valuable which raises the value of money in region 2, z2, and DM production,
q2.
12 In what follows, we assume the conditions in Proposition 2 are satisfied.
5.1 Efficiency
Achieving a constrained efficient allocation requires satisfying the conditions in Proposition 1. These
imply production levels q1 = q2 = q
∗, and a migration rate for region 1 households ρ1 that solves (11)
12The intuition for this multiplicity is similar to the complementarity between the value of money and agents’ entry
or search decisions in e.g. Rocheteau and Wright (2005) and Berentsen et al. (2007).
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given ρ2 = ρ¯2. The next proposition summarizes conditions for underinvestment or overinvestment in
migration when the monetary authority implements the Friedman rule.
Proposition 3. Suppose ι = 0, ρ2 = ρ2, and (20) holds. If θ1 > (ϑ1), households underinvest in
migration, ρ1 < ρ
∗
1, and if θ1 < (ϑ1), households over-invest in migration, ρ1 > ρ
∗
1.
The Friedman rule generates the efficient quantity per trade, q1 = q2 = q
∗, but typically not the
efficient migration rate. From Proposition 1, the individual migration rate ρ1 is socially efficient if
and only if θ1 = (ϑ1), i.e. the buyer’s bargaining power equals their contribution to the matching
process. In equilibrium, a buyer’s incentive to move decreases with their bargaining power at home,
i.e. ∂ρ1/∂θ1 < 0. Consider a small deviation from θ1 = (ϑ1). If θ1 increases, i.e. θ1 > (ϑ1), the
marginal gain from relocating given by the right side of (11) falls. As a result, ρ1 decreases and
households underinvest in migration, ρ1 < ρ
∗
1. On the other hand, if θ1 decreases, i.e. θ1 < (ϑ1), ρ1
increases since now the marginal gain from relocating is higher. In this case, households over-invest
in migration, ρ1 > ρ
∗
1.
Numerical Examples
To illustrate additional properties of equilibrium, we consider numerical examples that demonstrate
some of the model’s positive implications when there is underinvestment and overinvestment in mi-
gration. The matching function in region j is Mj(Bj ,Sj) = χj BjSjBj+Sj , where χj > 0 represents the
efficiency of the matching process in region j. This implies that buyers’ matching probabilities are
α1(ϑ1) =
χ1
(1−ρ1)+ρ¯2/n+1 and α2(ϑ2) =
χ2
(1−ρ¯2)+ρ1n+1 . DM utility and cost functions for production and
migration are, respectively, u(qj) = ln(qj + b)− ln(b) where b > 0, c(qj) = qj , and Φ1(ρ1) = ρ
2
1
1−ρ1 .
Table 3 summarizes the parameter values used in the examples. We consider two values for
household bargaining power in region 1, θ1, which together with (ϑ1) determines whether there is
under- or overinvestment in migration. We set θ2 = 0.55 to ensure the condition for uniqueness, (20),
is satisfied under both parameterizations. The annual discount rate is set to ρ = 3%, which gives
β = 0.97. As a benchmark, we set γ = β, which is the Friedman rule, but later consider examples
with higher values for γ.
Table 3: Parameter Values
β b n χ1 χ2 θ1 θ2 ρ¯2 γ
0.97 0.001 0.03 1.17 1 0.4, 0.5 0.55 0.02 0.97
When θ1 = 0.5, the matching elasticity in region 1 is (ϑ1) = 0.41. Since θ1 > (ϑ1), households ,
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Figure 1: Effects of Money Growth on Migration and Production with One Sided Migration
undervest in migration, i.e. the equilibrium migration rate ρ1 = 0.09 is below the first best ρ
∗
1 = 0.12.
In contrast, when θ1 = 0.4, (ϑ1) = 0.44, which implies overinvestment in migration, i.e. ρ1 = 0.17.
Figure 1 illustrates the effects of money growth on the migration rate, ρ1, and regional production,
q1 and q2, for the two parameterizations of θ1. As γ increases, DM output in both regions fall while
the migration rate increases. In addition, the percent change in DM output is larger when households
face a lower bargaining power in region 1. In our example, the percent change in the migration rate
in region 1 is smaller compared to DM production in region 1, which suggests the intensive margin
(output per trade) responds more to monetary policy than the extensive margin (total number of
trades).
While higher money growth increases migration, this effect is only second order while the negative
intensive margin effect is first order. Hence the Friedman rule is still optimal. While the Friedman rule
delivers efficiency in DM production in both regions, migration is inefficiently high when θ1 = 0.4 and
inefficiently low when θ1 = 0.5. Under positive nominal interest rates, union wide welfare is always
higher when buyer’s bargaining power in region 1 is larger. This finding suggests the drop in DM
production is larger when buyer’s in region 1 face a lower bargaining power, relative to the increase
in the migration rate. Moreover, as γ increases, the welfare difference between the two economies
increases. We next consider how fiscal instruments may be able to correct this extensive margin
distortion.
5.2 Fiscal Policy
From the previous section, efficiency on all margins requires satisfying the Friedman rule at the union
level and Hosios conditions at the regional level. Without migration, monetary policy is sufficient,
and the Friedman rule achieves the first best. With endogenous migration, buyers do not internalize
the externalities their migration decisions have on matching probabilities in the DM. Since monetary
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policy alone is not enough to correct this distortion, we consider an additional instrument that can
target migration rates at the regional level. Here we consider fiscal policy through region specific tax
or subsidies in the DM.
In the following, we consider a proportional tax or subsidy on DM production. With one sided
mobility, the scheme only applies to producers in region 2 (we consider the two sided case where
producers from both regions are subsidized or taxed in Section 6). To implement this policy, we
assume the government has access to a costless record keeping technology that keeps track of the
identity and production of producers but not identify of households in the DM.13 For instance, the
government can record DM production since producers are in fixed and known locations due to
immobile factors of production.14 Hence while the fiscal authority cannot directly tax household
migration decisions, they can indirectly affect migration rates by taxing DM profits of producers,
which affects the expected surplus of migrating.
As in Gomis-Porqueras and Peralta-Alva (2010), the government institutes a proportional subsidy
or tax on DM goods implemented through lump sum monetary injections/withdrawals in the beginning
of the CM. After CM trade but before the next DM, the monetary authority implements changes in
the money supply through (a different) lump sum transfer to all households. Implicit in our set up
is that the currency union is also a fiscal union: the fiscal authority is taxing (subsidizing) region 2
production but finances it by subsidizing (taxing) both regions through the common inflation tax.
As a result, there is redistribution between households and producers in region 2 which will play an
important role in internalizing the congestion externality from migration decisions.15
Terms of trade in region 2 are still determined through Kalai bargaining, but now includes the
subsidy/tax, τ2 ∈ [−1, 1], on region 2 production. Terms of trade now solve
max
q2,d2
{u(q2)− c(q2)}
s.t. u(q2)− d2 = θ2
1− θ2 [d2(1 + τ2)− q2]
d2 ≤ z2,
where q2 also depends implicitly on ρ1. If z2 >
(1−θ2)u(q∗)+θ2c(q∗)
1+τ2θ2
, the household has enough real
13If all agents are anonymous in the DM, the government cannot directly tax productive activities. However, when the
identity of some agents are known and a record of their production is available to the government, the fiscal authority
can tax or subsidize DM activity.
14The fact that producers’ identities are known does not preclude money being socially useful since all households
are still anonymous. In addition, anonymity of some private agents does not preclude the government from raising tax
revenues. As in Chari and Kehoe (1993), taxes directly levied on firms are feasible as their output is observable.
15This is consistent with a classic proposal from Kenen (1969) on the importance of fiscal integration in a monetary
union. See also the literature on fiscal policy in monetary unions, e.g. Sibert (1992), Dixit and Lambertini (2001),
Beetsma and Uhlig (1999), Cooper and Kempf (2004) and Chari and Kehoe (2008), and references therein.
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balances to purchase the efficient quantity q∗. Otherwise, the household is cash constrained and will
just hand over all his real balances to the seller so that d2 = z2 and q2 solves
d2 =
(1− θ2)u(q2) + θ2c(q2)
1 + τ2θ2
.
When d2 = z2, there are two cases. When τ2 ∈ (0, 1], the fiscal authority enacts a subsidy and
∂q2
∂τ2
=
z2θ2
(1− θ2)u′(q2) + θ2c′(q2) > 0.
Hence output produced in region 2 is increasing in the subsidy, τ2 ∈ (0, 1]. In addition, notice τ2 also
affects buyers’ effective bargaining power, τ2θ2, which can make fiscal policy especially useful.
16 In
particular, τ2θ2 affects the magnitude of the effective buyer’s surplus in region 2 relative to region 1,
which affects the migration decision by buyers in region 1. Since q2 is increasing in ρ1, the subsidy
increases migration and brings ρ1 closer to the first best ρ
∗
1. Hence, there is a trade off between output
produced in DM and the migration rate. This creates room for fiscal and monetary policies to exploit
the trade off between intensive and extensive margins.
When the fiscal authority enacts a proportional tax, i.e. τ2 ∈ [−1, 0), DM output decreases with
τ2 (
∂q2
∂τ2
< 0) and the migration rate decreases (∂ρ1∂τ2 < 0). We wil show how this fiscal policy scheme
could raise welfare if there is underinvestment in migration.
5.3 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies
We now consider the design of optimal policy following the Ramsey tradition. In this context, the
government chooses the monetary-fiscal policy mix to maximize union wide welfare, taking as given the
government budget constraint and equilibrium decisions of private agents. The available instruments
are the money growth rate for the union, γ, and the production tax/subsidy on region 2’s DM
production, τ2. Importantly, the monetary and fiscal authorities sets (γ, τ2 once and for all and can
commit to their policies. The policy problem is given by
max
γ,τ2
{
n
α1(ϑ1)
ϑ1
[u(q1)− c(q1)]− nΦ(ρ1) + α2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
[u(q2)− c(q2)]− Φ(ρ2)
}
(21)
subject to (11), the equilibrium conditions for q1 and q2,
ι = (1− ρ1)α1(ϑ1)L1(q1) + ρ1α2(ϑ2)(1 + τ2θ2)L2(q2), (22)
16Instead of a proportional scheme, the government could alternatively propose a lump sum subsidy on region 2 sellers.
In that case, there would be less change on production since a lump sum subsidy would only affect the total surplus.
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ι = ρ2α1(ϑ1)L1(q1) + (1− ρ)2)α2(ϑ2)(1 + τ2θ2)L2(q2), (23)
the government budget constraint,
φS = τ2 α2(ϑ2) [ρ1 + (1− ρ¯2)] z2, (24)
and the market clearing condition,
φM(γ − 1) = φS + T , (25)
φM = z1 + nz2. (26)
The first three constraints correspond to equilibrium decisions of private agents: (11) determines the
migration rate, while (22) and (23) determine production in the two regions given taxes/subsidies
in region 2. In addition, (24) defines the size of the subsidy paid to sellers in region 2, (25) is the
government budget constraint, and (32) is the money market clearing condition. Since the central
bank prints money in the CM and distributes it to households, there is a redistribution of resources
to producers in the DM when τ2 6= 0.
Since the optimal policy mix depends on whether there is under or overinvestment in migration,
we consider two cases: θ1 = 0.4, which implies overinvestment in migration at the Friedman rule, and
θ1 = 0.5, which implies underinvestment. Figure 2 shows the optimal policy mix, (γ, τ2), for these
two scenarios; the top panels assume θ1 = 0.4 and the bottom panels assume θ1 = 0.5. The blue lines
in left panels plot union welfare against the money growth rate γ, assuming that the fiscal authority
follows the optimal policy τ∗2 . Instead, the red (yellow) line assumes a value of τ below (above) the
optimal τ∗2 . Similarly, the right panel plot welfare against the tax rate τ2, in blue we plot the optimal
money growth rate γ∗ and lower (higher) values of γ below (above) in red (yellow).
When households overinvest in migration (θ1 = 0.4), optimal monetary policy is the Friedman
rule. In contrast, with underinvestment (θ1 = 0.5), optimal monetary policy is a money growth rate
above the Friedman rule, γ = 0.9752. This is illustrated by the top left panel for θ1 = 0.4 and the
bottom left panel for θ1 = 0.5. In both cases, there is deflation, γ < 1, and hence all buyers face
lump sum taxes in the CM. These results highlight the importance of having a monetary-fiscal union
that implements the union wide inflation tax. Since the deviation from the Friedman rule is not large
in this example, the intertemporal distortion may be more relevant than the congestion externality
induced by endogenous migration. Indeed, the middle left panel shows the Friedman rule can still be
optimal even when other instruments are available to the government. This arises when a production
tax in the DM is required, i.e. when τ2 = −0.003 as in the left panel. In contrast, the Friedman
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Figure 2: Welfare and Optimal Policies with One Sided Migration
rule is not optimal when there is a production subsidy, i.e. τ2 = 0.027 when θ1 = 0.5 as in the left
panel. These results highlight the importance of the redistribution from buyers to sellers of region 2
to correct the congestion externality.
We now study how these optimal policies respond with changes in model parameters, i.e. match-
ing efficiency in both regions and the buyer’s bargaining power in region 2. Figure 3 summarizes
comparative statics with respect to the parameters governing optimal monetary policy γ (when fiscal
policy is fixed at its optimal value) and optimal fiscal policy τ2 (assuming monetary policy is fixed at
its optimal value) when θ1 = 0.4 (left) and θ1 = 0.5 (right).
The blue lines denote the optimal money growth rate, γ, while the orange lines denote the optimal
tax/subsidy rate in region 2, τ2. From Figure 4, higher matching efficiency and household bargaining
power in region 2 result in larger fiscal responses. These are more accentuated when buyers are
under-investing in their migration decisions.
6 Two Sided Migration
We now allow households from both regions to migrate. In this case, ρ1 and ρ2 jointly solve the first
order conditions associated with the buyers’ migration decisions which are given by equations (11)
and (12). We first consider equilibrium where monetary policy follows the Friedman rule, ι = 0, and
there is no fiscal policy. As a result, changes in bargaining power and matching efficiency do not
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Figure 3: Comparative Statics for Optimal Policies with One Sided Migration
produce any distortion along the intensive margin, i.e. on q1 and q2. However, the extensive margin,
ρ1 and ρ2, will still be affected where the effects are summarized by the following table.
Table 4: Comparative Statics Two Sided Migration
θ1 θ2 χ1 χ2
ρ1 − + − +
ρ2 + − + −
These results are consistent with those found in the one sided migration case. More precisely,
an increase in household bargaining power or matching efficiency at home decreases migration to the
destination region. As in the one sided case, buyers choose to relocate to regions they expect to
have larger surpluses, which are associated with regions with increased buyer’s bargaining power and
matching efficiencies.
Similarly, the response of the migration rates in both regions depend critically on how far equi-
librium values are from the first best. To illustrate this effect, Figure 4 shows the effect of changes
in bargaining and matching efficiencies on migration rates, ρ1 and ρ2, using the same benchmark
parametrization as in the one sided case.
From Figure 4, the equilibrium migration response in region 2 are much smaller than the ones
observed in region 1. Moreover, the effects of bargaining power and matching efficiency are monotonic
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Figure 4: Comparative Statics with Two Sided Migration
and piecewise linear. These depend on whether equilibrium migration rates are above or below the
corresponding first best migration rates. The equilibrium migration response in the two regions
relative to the first best is much larger when bargaining power changes. This property reflects the
importance of the buyer’s bargaining power in the determining the expected surplus. Changes in
the matching efficiency deliver smaller departures from the first best, indicating that the associated
changes in the extensive margin are relatively small. It is also worth highlighting that when buyers
of both regions can migrate, the smaller region shows a larger response to changes in matching
efficiency. In addition, the differential equilibrium migration response between buyers facing θ1 = 0.4
and θ1 = 0.5 is much larger when matching efficiencies change.
6.1 Optimal Monetary and Fiscal Policies
With two sided migration, there is an additional instrument available to the fiscal authority. Now
the optimal policy mix consists of a money growth rate for the union and production tax/subsidies in
both regions (γ, τ1, τ2) that maximize social welfare of the union subject to the equilibrium conditions,
government budget constraint, and market clearing conditions. The policy problem with two sided
migration is
max
γ,τ1,τ2
{
n
α1(ϑ1)
ϑ1
[u(q1)− c(q1)]− nΦ(ρ1) + α2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
[u(q2)− c(q2)]− Φ(ρ2)
}
(27)
subject to (11) and (12), the equilibrium conditions for q1 and q2
ι = (1− ρ1)α1(ϑ1)(1 + τ1θ1)L1(q1) + ρ1α2(ϑ2)(1 + τ2θ2)L2(q2), (28)
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ι = ρ2α1(ϑ1)(1 + τ1θ1)L1(q1) + (1− ρ)2)α2(ϑ2)(1 + τ2θ2)L2(q2), (29)
the subsidy size, government budget constraint, and the market clearing condition
φS = τ1 α1(ϑ1) [(1− ρ1)n+ ρ2]z1 + τ2α2(ϑ2)[ρ1 + (1− ρ2)]z2, (30)
φM(γ − 1) = φS + T , (31)
φM = z1 + nz2. (32)
The first four constraints correspond to equilibrium decisions of private agents. In particular,
equations (11) and (12) determine the optimal migration rates for buyers in region 1 an d 2 respectively,
while (28) and (29) determine production in the two regions given taxes/subsidies in region 1 and
2. In addition, (30) defines the size of the subsidy paid to sellers in region 2, (31) is the government
budget constraint, and (32) is the money market clearing condition. Since the central bank prints
money in the CM and distributes it to households, there is a redistribution of resources to producers
in the DM when τ2 6= 0.
As in the one sided case, we numerically compute the optimal policy using the benchmark
parametrization in Table 3. The optimal policy is the Friedman rule and zero taxes in both re-
gions. This finding highlights that correcting the potential distortions in the intensive margin is much
more important than bringing the extensive margin closer to the efficient level. The qualitative re-
sults obtained in the two sided migration case are in line with the results under one sided migration.
In both cases, the authorities in the monetary union prioritize the intensive margin rather than the
extensive one.
7 Conclusion
In this paper, we constructed an open economy model of a currency union with endogenous migration
and studied the roles of monetary and fiscal policies at correcting distortions along the intensive
margin – the quantity traded per match – and the extensive margin – the total number of trades.
Due to regional spillovers from agents’ migration decisions, equilibrium is generically inefficient. While
monetary policy can eliminate the intensive margin distortion by running the Friedman rule, migration
rates can still be too high or too low, unless in the knife edge case when the Hosios condition is also
satisfied. To correct this inefficiency, we introduce fiscal policy that can tax or subsidize production
at the regional level.
Key to our analysis is the assumption that the monetary union is also a fiscal union: the fiscal au-
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thority is taxing (subsidizing) production but finances it by subsidizing (taxing) both regions through
the common inflation tax. Consequently, fiscal policy leads to redistribution between households and
producers and hence can be set to minimize the extensive margin distortion. When only households
from one region can migrate, the optimal policy mix entails a deviation from the Friedman rule and
either a production subsidy if there is underinvestment in migration or a production tax if there
is overinvestment. However when households from both regions can migrate, optimal policy is the
Friedman rule and zero taxes in both regions. Overall, this finding indicates that the (intensive mar-
gin) distortions in quantity traded are more socially beneficial to correct than the (extensive margin)
distortions in migration rates. A potential avenue for future work is to allow for further heterogeneity
and examine its consequences for trade-off between inflation and migration.
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Appendix
Proof of Lemma 1
To obtain the social optimum, we differentiate the social welfare function (2) with respect to q1, q2,
ρ1, and ρ2. The first order condition with respect to qj yields u
′(qj) = c′(qj) and hence q1 = q2 = q∗.
The first order conditions with respect to ρj > 0 are
{
n
(
α′1(ϑ1)
ϑ1
− α1(ϑ1)
ϑ21
)
∂ϑ1
∂ρ1
+
(
α′2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
− α2(ϑ2)
ϑ22
)
∂ϑ2
∂ρ1
}
[u(q∗)− c(q∗)] = nΦ′1(ρ1)
{(
α′1(ϑ1)
ϑ1
− α1(ϑ1)
ϑ21
)
∂ϑ1
∂ρ2
+
(
α′2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
− α2(ϑ2)
ϑ22
)
∂ϑ2
∂ρ2
}
[u(q∗)− c(q∗)] = Φ′2(ρ2)
where
∂ϑ1
∂ρ1
= ϑ21 ;
∂ϑ2
∂ρ2
= ϑ22
∂ϑ1
∂ρ2
= −ϑ
2
1
n
;
∂ϑ2
∂ρ1
= −nϑ22.
Upon substituting and rewriting, we obtain
Φ′1(ρ
∗
1) =
[
α2(ϑ
∗
2)
(
1− α
′
2(ϑ
∗
2)ϑ
∗
2
α2(ϑ∗2)
)
− α1(ϑ∗1)
(
1− α
′
1(ϑ
∗
1)ϑ
∗
1
α1(ϑ∗1)
)]
[u(q∗)− c(q∗)],
Φ′2(ρ
∗
2) =
[
α1(ϑ
∗
1)
(
1− α
′
1(ϑ
∗
1)ϑ
∗
1
α1(ϑ∗1)
)
− α2(ϑ∗2)
(
1− α
′
2(ϑ
∗
2)ϑ
∗
2
α2(ϑ∗2)
)]
[u(q∗)− c(q∗)],
which are (5) and (6) in the main text. 
Proof of Proposition 1
To show the Friedman rule, ι = 0, produces the efficient quantity of trade, q1 = q2 = q
∗, consider the
equilibrium values for q1 and q2 given by (15) and (16). Setting ι = 0 gives u
′(qj) = c′(qj) and hence,
q1 = q2 = q
∗. Equilibrium migration rates are given by (11) and (12) at ι = 0, or
Φ′1(ρ1) = [α2(ϑ2)θ2 − α1(ϑ1)θ1] [u(q∗)− c(q∗)], (33)
Φ′2(ρ2) = [α1(ϑ1)θ1 − α2(ϑ2)θ2] [u(q∗)− c(q∗)]. (34)
It is now easy to see the equilibrium migration rates equal the first best allocations if (33) and (34)
coincide with (5) and (6), respectively. This is happen if and only if θj = (ϑj). 
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Proof of Proposition 2
Equilibrium has a recursive structure. Once ρ1 is determined by 41, we obtain q1(ρ1) and q2(ρ1) from
(39) and (40). Real balances z1 and z2 are then pinned down by (9) and (10). Since Φ1(0) = Φ
′
1(0) = 0
and Φ′′1 > 0, the left side of (41) is increasing in ρ1. To show the equilibrium exists and is unique, we
first establish there is a unique solution, z1, rewritten as maxz1≥0O(z1; ι) where
O(z1; ι) ≡ −ιz1 − Φ(ρ1) + (1− ρ1) α1(ϑ1) θ1[u(q1)− c(q1)] + ρ1 α2(ϑ2) θ2[u(q2)− c(q2)]
With no loss in generality, we can restrict the choice for z1 to the compact interval [0, z
∗
1 ] where
z∗1 ≡ (1 − θ1)c(q∗) + θ1u(q∗). If z1 > z∗1 , then O′(z1; ι) = −ι. Moreover, O(z1; ι) is continuous in z1.
Hence a solution exists by the Theorem of the Maximum and maxz1≥0O(z1; ι) is continuous in ι. A
similar argument applies to the solution to z2. Under Kalai bargaining, money is valued if and only
if ι < min{ θ11−θ1 , θ21−θ2 }.
Next, we establish there is a unique solution, ρ1 to (15). Since Φ(·) is strictly convex, ρ1 is uniquely
defined and continuous by the Theorem of the Maximum. Hence a solution exists. To make sure there
exist a unique positive solution for ρ1 at ι = 0, we need Φ1(0) > 0 which is satisfied if (20) holds.
Comparative statics for ρ1 are obtained by applying the implicit function theorem and Cramer’s
rule:
∂ρ1
∂θ1
=
α1(ϑ
∗
1)[u(q
∗)− c(q∗)]
∂F1
∂ρ1
|ι=0
< 0,
∂ρ1
∂θ2
= −α2(ϑ
∗
1)[u(q
∗)− c(q∗)]
∂F1
∂ρ1
|ι=0
> 0,
where
∂F1
∂ρ1
∣∣∣
ι=0
= −Φ′′1(ρ∗1) + [α′2(ϑ∗2)(−nϑ∗22 )θ2 − α′1(ϑ∗1)ϑ∗21 θ1][u(q∗)− c(q∗)] < 0. (35)
If ι is small and (20) holds, ∂ρ1/∂θ1 < 0 and ∂ρ1/∂θ2 > 0.
At ι = 0, comparative statics with respect to ι are
dρ1
dι
∣∣∣
ι=0
= 0
dq1
dι
∣∣∣
ι=0
=
1
α1(ϑ∗1)L′1(q∗)
< 0
dq2
dι
∣∣∣
ι=0
=
1
α2(ϑ∗2)L′2(q∗)
< 0
(36)
where we used that
L′j(q∗) =
θj(c
′u′′ − u′c′′)
[θjc′ + (1− θj)u′]2
∣∣∣
q=q∗
< 0. (37)
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Proof of Proposition 3
We measure steady state welfare for the union at the start of DM, before households make their
migration decisions and portfolio choices.
W ≡ nα1(ϑ1)
ϑ1
[u(q1)− c(q1)] + α2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
[u(q2)− c(q2)]− nΦ1(ρ̂1)− Φ2(ρ̂2), (38)
where nα1(ϑ1)ϑ1 and
α2(ϑ2)
ϑ2
are the measure of matches in DM of regions 1 and 2. Equilibrium values
for z1, z2, ρ1, q1, and q2 are given by (9), (10), (11), (12), (15), and (16).
At ι = 0, q1 = q2 = q
∗, and social welfare is
WFR ≡ nα1(ϑ
FR
1 )
ϑFR1
[u(q∗)− c(q∗)] + α2(ϑ
FR
2 )
ϑFR2
[u(q∗)− c(q∗)]− nΦ1(ρFR1 )− Φ2(ρFR2 ),
where ϑFR1 is market tightness at ι = 0 and ρ
FR
1 solves (33). Defining (ϑ1) ≡ 1 − ϑ1 α
′
1(ϑ1)
α1(ϑ1)
as the
elasticity of the matching function in region 1, the socially optimal migration rates from (5) solves
(5). We next establish ∂ρ1/∂θ1 < 0 at ι = 0:
∂ρ1
∂θ1
∣∣∣∣
ι=0
=
−α1(ϑ1)[u(q∗)− c(q∗)]
Φ′′(ρ1) +
[
θ2α′2(ϑ2)ϑ22/n− θ1α′1(ϑ1)ϑ21
]
[u(q∗)− c(q∗)] < 0,
where we assumed the condition for uniqueness, (20), holds.
If θ1 = (ϑ1), ρ1 = ρ
∗
1 from Proposition 1. Now consider a small deviation from θ1 = (ϑ1). If θ1
increases, i.e. θ1 > (ϑ1), ρ1 falls since ∂ρ1/∂θ1 < 0. As a result, ρ1 < ρ
∗
1. Similarly, if θ1 decreases,
i.e. θ1 < (ϑ1), ρ1 now increases. Hence, ρ1 > ρ
∗
1. 
Equilibrium Conditions Under Functional Forms in Sections 5 and 6
Given the functional forms in Section 5, q1(ρ1) and q2(ρ1) are given by
q1(ρ1) =
θ1 − (1− θ1)F1(ρ1)
θ1(1 + F1(ρ1))
− b, (39)
q2(ρ1) =
θ2 − (1− θ2)F2(ρ1)
θ2(1 + F2(ρ1))
− b, (40)
where
F1(ρ1) ≡ ι(1− ρ1 − ρ¯2)
(1− ρ¯2)(1− ρ1)− ρ1ρ¯2
(1− ρ1) + ρ¯2/n+ 1
χ1
,
31
F2(ρ1) ≡ ι(1− ρ1 − ρ¯2)
(1− ρ¯2)(1− ρ1)− ρ1ρ¯2
(1− ρ¯2) + ρ1n+ 1
χ2
.
The migration rate, ρ1, solves
ρ1(2− ρ1)
(1− ρ1)2 =
χ2θ2[ln(q2(ρ1) + b)− ln(b)− q2(ρ1)]
(1− ρ¯2) + ρ1n+ 1 −
χ1θ1[ln(q1(ρ1) + b)− ln(b)− q1(ρ1)]
(1− ρ1) + ρ¯2/n+ 1 . (41)
Given the functional forms from Section 6, resulting equilibrium migration rates ρ1 and ρ2 solve
ρ1(2− ρ1)
(1− ρ1)2 =
χ2θ2[ln(q2(ρ1, ρ2) + b)− ln(b)− q2(ρ1, ρ2)]
(1− ρ2) + ρ1n+ 1 −
χ1θ1[ln(q1(ρ1, ρ2) + b)− ln(b)− q1(ρ1, ρ2)]
(1− ρ1) + ρ2/n+ 1 ,
(42)
ρ2(2− ρ1)
(1− ρ2)2 =
χ1θ1[ln(q1(ρ1, ρ2) + b)− ln(b)− q1(ρ1, ρ2)]
(1− ρ1) + ρ2/n+ 1 −
χ2θ1[ln(q2(ρ1, ρ2) + b)− ln(b)− q2(ρ1, ρ2)]
(1− ρ2) + ρ1n+ 1 ;
(43)
where q1(ρ1) and q2(ρ1) are given by
q1(ρ1, ρ2) =
θ1 − (1− θ1)F1(ρ1, ρ2)
θ1(1 + F1(ρ1, ρ2))
− b , q2(ρ1, ρ2) = θ2 − (1− θ2)F2(ρ1, ρ2)
θ2(1 + F2(ρ1, ρ2))
− b,
with
F1(ρ1, ρ2) ≡ ι(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ1)− ρ1ρ¯2
(1− ρ1) + ρ2/n+ 1
χ1
;
F2(ρ1, ρ2) ≡ ι(1− ρ1 − ρ2)
(1− ρ2)(1− ρ1)− ρ1ρ2
(1− ρ2) + ρ1n+ 1
χ2
.
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